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Only a few months before his death, Wittgenstein 
invited us to imagine “that some propositions, of the form 
of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned 
as channels for such empirical propositions as were not 
hardened but fluid”; nevertheless he warned “this relation 
altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and 
hard ones became fluid” (OC 96). Those hardened 
propositions provide a certainty which is “like a mighty 
force whose point of application does not move, and so no 
work is accomplished by it” (Z 402). There are many things 
that seem to be fixed, things which are removed from the 
traffic: they are “so to speak shunted onto an unused 
siding” (OC 210). Those things just give “our way of 
looking at things, and our researches, their form” (OC 
211). Maybe they were once disputed; but perhaps, for 
unthinkable ages, they have belonged to the scaffolding of 
our thoughts. 
Wittgenstein himself admitted there is no sharp 
boundary between propositions of logic and empirical 
propositions (OC 319); besides, he noticed that the 
concept “proposition” (Satz) is not a sharp one (OC 320). 
As Wittgenstein pointed out, we shall consider a 
proposition as grammatical only if it is used so (RC III, 19), 
that is, a proposition may be grammatical or empirical 
depending on the context where it appears (cf. Z 427; OC 
98). We can say about an empirical proposition “One could 
imagine this in another way” or “One could imagine the 
opposite too” (cf. RFM IV, 4), while the proposition which 
can be imagined only as true becomes grammatical and 
loses its temporal nature (cf. OC 57): in fact, these are 
propositions about which language users agree, although it 
would be more suitable to regard those propositions as 
“nonsense” (PI 252), or like a mere whistling or a simple 
humming (Z 401). One of the examples Wittgenstein chose 
to show what he meant by “grammatical proposition” was 
“Every rod has a length” (PI 251). He says when we try to 
imagine that proposition, the only we can imagine is a rod: 
there is no room to imagine a picture of the opposite. We 
can imagine a rod, but not “Every rod has a length”. 
Anyway, we must not forget that whenever attention is paid 
to an apparent but isolated grammatical proposition, it will 
always be possible to contemplate such proposition as 
empirical, although this should demand to put it in a 
context we shall have chosen ad hoc. In this sense, we 
can resort to a golden rule which consists in imagining that 
apparent grammatical proposition is employed to teach a 
child how any term from such proposition can be used: for 
example, we could choose “Every rod has a length” to 
show somebody how the nouns “rod” and “length” are 
used, but also to teach that boy or girl how he or she can 
use the adjective “every” or the verb “to have”. 
Empirical propositions that count as certain for us 
are countless (OC 273), and the truth of these propositions 
(OC 83) belongs to our frame of reference 
(Bezugssystem). By the way, when I refer to a frame of 
reference I shall allude to the channel made up by 
grammatical (or hardened) propositions. For this point I 
base mainly on what Wittgenstein said once about such 
frames. In his opinion, every empirical (or fluid) proposition 
can work as a rule if that proposition is verified and 
immobilized in such a way that all the representation 
revolves around it; so that proposition becomes a part of 
the frame of reference and independent of facts (RFM VII, 
74): in the end the hardened proposition becomes a 
paradigm to judge experience (RFM VI, 22), that is to say, 
it becomes a norm of description (Norm der Beschreibung) 
(OC 167). At the bottom of this frame there is a 
grammatical basis shared by every human being since it 
will make sense to talk in terms of “human beings” only if 
one can say all of them have sensations; they see; are 
blind; hear; are deaf; are conscious or unconscious, etc. 
Wittgenstein pointed out these characteristics can be said 
“only of a living human being and what resembles 
(behaves like) a living human being” (PI 281): I think the 
words in brackets, “behaves like” (sich ähnlich benimmt), 
place the emphasis not on the beings (or even “things” 
such as automata) which resemble living human beings, 
but on the common human form of life itself. On the other 
hand, it is obvious there are very different cultures and 
societies: a Tibetan Buddhist monk and an Irish fisherman 
share, as I said above, a common form of life, but besides, 
each of them is immersed in a rather different form of life 
which means different habits and a different linguistic 
community. So the main point is not how to draw the 
boundary between two different forms of life, but the fact 
that there are different forms of life. 
Since all languages are founded on convention (PI 
355), that is, since they require not only agreement in 
judgments and definitions (PI 242), but a regular 
connection between what people say and do too (PI 207), 
the idea of a “form of life” entails collective activities: there 
is no room for individual forms of life. By the way, the most 
famous example of this logical impossibility is the private 
language user´s; as this individual should not lean on the 
common frame of reference, he has no criterion of 
correctness, and whatever is going to seem right to him is 
right (PI 258). The private language user is fated to see the 
ground vanishing under his feet because there is no room 
to talk about “right”; in other words, communication turns 
out to be impossible from the beginning. Sometimes, 
however, communication is possible but it may be 
hindered because of the appearance of solidified or 
grammatical propositions which are not shared by all the 
members of the linguistic community in question; in fact, 
the only requirement for these propositions is a practice 
which can be carried out not by one unique individual, but 
by individuals having mutual responses and interactions. 
Some circles of the frame of reference are wide enough to 
hold such propositions: it is true in some circles (for 
example, the grammar of sensations) there will not be 
room for these propositions, but they can proliferate in 
areas like religion, art, politics, or philosophy itself. So a 
remark like “You can´t hear God speak to someone else, 
you can hear him only if you are being addressed” may be 
considered by a particular individual, for example 
Wittgenstein (Z 717), as grammatical, that is, as something 
which does not admit discussion and besides, supports to 
a large extent loads of his own customs and ideas, but 
another person can regard it as an empirical proposition 
because in his or her opinion it depends on divine will. In 
other words, someone can be uncertain where I am 
certain: Wittgenstein thought this is a fact of nature 
because concepts with fixed limits would involve a 
uniformity of behaviour (Z 374). From now on I shall talk 
about “individual grammatical propositions” whenever I 
refer to a grammatical proposition which can be 
understood but is not shared by the linguistic community in 




question, that is, I shall always talk about “individual 
grammatical propositions” as opposed to a specific 
linguistic community. 
In this paper I would like to pay attention to a 
specific kind of individual grammatical propositions, I 
mean, those individual grammatical propositions that show 
how some people are not able to see themselves in certain 
ways which all of us think they should have no problem to 
see themselves. To put an example, we can imagine the 
case of Bob. This head of the family studied economics a 
long time ago, but he has worked as a cook in burger bars 
since then. Bob meets his ex-mates from time to time. 
They have good jobs in banks and finance companies, but 
Bob works in a burger bar, is sixty, and knows he will 
never work as an economist: he knows it is too late. As 
time passed Bob felt more and more inferior to his ex-
mates until the proposition “I am inferior to my ex-mates” 
became grammatical for him, that is, it became an 
individual grammatical proposition. Bob explains this point 
in numerical terms. As he says, nobody can doubt “4<8”. 
So when “8<4” confronts him, he says the sign “<” has 
been misused; however, if Bob concentrates on the 
relation “8<x” when “8<4” confronts him, then he will not 
see “4” as the number four, but only as a scribble. In the 
same way Bob cannot see himself as equal or superior to 
his ex-mates: he would exclaim at most “But that´s not me! 
I can´t see myself in that picture! Can you imagine yourself 
taking an oil tanker on your shoulders? And don´t think of a 
cartoon, think of the ship!”. 
In this case the proposition in question has 
become a paradigm to judge experience only for a specific 
person; obviously there are millions and millions of 
persons who fortunately have not an inferiority complex, 
but there are many people undergoing this problem: in 
fact, anybody could have this complex. In spite of 
everything, if we thought Bob´s problem is limited to get 
flustered whenever he meets one of his ex-mates and 
nothing more, we would make the mistake G. Ryle (Ryle 
1984, 44) highlighted several decades ago. As Ryle 
pointed out, there are many people “expecting dispositions 
to have uniform exercises”: they think these are single-
track dispositions, that is to say, they assume there is one-
pattern intellectual processes in which these dispositions 
are actualised. But appearances can be deceptive: if we 
wished to unpack all that is conveyed by a dispositional 
concept, we should have to produce, as Ryle remarked, 
“an infinite series of different hypothetical propositions”. 
Regarding Bob´s case, we can imagine easily that besides 
getting low marks in self-esteem tests, being pessimistic to 
face up to some tasks, etc, Bob often could repeat 
expressions of the kind of “I am a failure”, “I have no right 
to be happy”, “My wife will always be disappointed in me”, 
… Thus far, however, all these points are common to 
ordinary inferiority complexes, but one of the distinguishing 
features of individual grammatical propositions is that 
individuals are prone to assimilate as grammatical another 
derived propositions too. So Bob can meet bankers and 
economists of whom he does not know whether they 
studied in the same university he finished his degree 
course: be that as it may, Bob will be prone to feel inferior 
to these bankers and economists as if they were his ex-
mates; in the same way, Bob will be prone to feel inferior 
to another persons who have been successful in their 
professional careers, such as engineers, lawyers, 
physicians, etc. Bearing in mind that Bob assimilated these 
points as grammatical certainties, he would be prone also 
to consider “I am a failure”, “I have no right to be happy”, or 
“My wife will always be disappointed in me” as 
grammatical propositions. The mere fact that Bob cannot 
talk about or see himself as he could before this 
assimilation shows the great influence these propositions 
have on Bob. 
Since “everything lies open to view” (PI 126), 
everybody can find out his own individual grammatical 
propositions attending to his own use of language. From 
this standpoint the result of philosophy is simple (cf. Z 
452), but we are tempted to go further than we should. By 
the way, Wittgenstein warned us of one of the main 
difficulties in philosophy: “to begin at the beginning. And 
not try to go further back” (OC 471). It is true the common 
frame reflects our own form of life, that is, the ungrounded 
activities we engage in, but I am afraid whoever tries to 
face his own philosophical problems often will have to be 
ready to find out the beginning in what I have called 
“individual grammatical propositions”. So if we played 
down the variations allowed by grammar in the individual 
paradigms through which we confront experience, we 
would go against our own interests, but besides, if we 
played down those variations, we would not be doing 
justice to the man who said that working on philosophy is a 
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